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1. Introduction: Buber’s Daoism
Martin Buber’s engagement with Chinese philosophy, religion, and culture 
is a significant example of intercultural encounter and dialogical exchange 
in early twentieth-century philosophy.1 His early interpretations and selected 
translations of the Zhuangzi 莊子 and the literary work Strange Stories from 
a Chinese Studio (Liaozhai Zhiyi 聊齋誌異) of Pu Songling 蒲松齡 (1640–
1715), were informed by his own philosophical, cultural-political, and 
religious context and concerns.2 His approach to Chinese thought is 
structured by questions of mystical and dialogical experience, natural 
spontaneity and technological mechanization, and the this-worldly corporeal 
spirituality disclosed in Hasidic and Daoist sources. His intercultural 
engagements in turn informed the development of his own dialogical 
philosophical project, as Buber himself recognized and as is evident from 
the Daoist traces visible in his classic work I and Thou (Ich und Du, first 
published in German in 1923).3
Buber is primarily remembered as a thinker of Jewish religious experience, 
an advocate of ethical personalism, and a philosopher of dialogical 
communication. Additionally, furthermore, Buber practiced a preliminary 
form of intercultural philosophizing, did not limit the sense and range of the 
ethical to human persons, and interpreted communication through a 
phenomenology of interpersonal and embodied encounter, engagement, and 
conversation.
First, in contrast to his friend and collaborator Franz Rosenzweig, as well 
as later thinkers such as Emmanuel Levinas, Buber did not explicitly reject 
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(Rosenzweig) or casually dismiss (Levinas) Asian and other so-called “non-
Western” discourses.4 He engaged from his early to late works with mythic, 
religious, poetic, and philosophical sources and what they taught and 
transmitted (their teaching, Lehre) through image, word, and concept.5 
Buber’s vision of “Daoism” is as a “teaching of the way” that is taught 
through a full range of communicative media.6
Second, Buber’s “ethical personalism” does not rely on or entail a limited 
concept of the person that only includes other humans. His experiential and 
dialogical models, developed in part in relation to the Daodejing 道德經 
attributed to Laozi 老子 and the Zhuangzi, encompass the “myriad things” 
(wanwu 萬物): stones, trees, animals, other humans, and spiritual realities.7 
Buber’s expansive model of the “thing” and the possibility of ethically 
encountering it diverge from other accounts of “ethical personalism.” 
Buber’s relational approach to the thing and the other are linked with his 
assessment of these two early pre-Qin Daoist sources.8
Third, Buber conceives of dialogue as corporal, experiential, and 
personal. It occurs through (insofar as they can be distinguished) interpersonal 
and “interthingly” encounters, engagements, and exchanges. This 
phenomenological and to an extent semi-Daoist description and interpretation 
of communicative events continues to be a radical alternative to the abstract 
formalistic paradigms that dominate the philosophy of language and 
communication. Buber is not a practitioner of phenomenology understood 
as following the phenomenological school and methods inaugurated by 
Edmund Husserl. He does, nonetheless, practice phenomenology in the sense 
of describing and interpreting what is revealed in and what exceeds 
experience. These descriptions draw on his own personal experience, self-
reflection, and a variety of global philosophical and non-philosophical 
sources and discourses. Of these, the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi play a 
noteworthy role, particularly in the 1910s and 1920s.9
2. The Daodejing as Natural Philosophy, 
Cosmology, and Ontology
Buber’s initial systematic interpretation of Daoism is articulated in his 1909 
essay “The Teaching of the Dao” (“Die Lehre vom Tao”) that became part 
of his afterword to his 1910 edition of the Zhuangzi.10 In this early account, 
the Daodejing is portrayed as the more embryonic beginning of the teaching 
of the Way, and the Zhuangzi as its communicative culmination.11 Laozi is 
taken here to be a more primitive and less perfect teacher of the Way, because 
the Daodejing lacks the fuller use of language and the communicative 
fulfillment of the Way that Buber attributed to the Zhuangzi. However, in 
discussions in 1924 (“Besprechungen mit Martin Buber über Lao-tse’s 
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Tao-te-king”) and 1928 (“China und Wir”), his translation of selected 
political passages into Hebrew in 1942 (“Lao Tzu al hashilton” [Laozi on 
Governing]), and references in later works, it is the Daodejing that occupies 
Buber’s attention.12
Buber offered a seminar devoted to the Daodejing to a private group in 
Ascona in southern Switzerland from August 10 to 31, 1924. The transcripts 
for this seminar were published in 2013 in volume 2.3, Schriften zur 
Chinesischen Philosophie und Literatur, of the new on-going edition of 
Buber’s collected works.13 The archivally accessible yet previously 
unpublished 1924 manuscript has received considerably less attention than 
his other writings concerning Chinese philosophy and literature. It unfolds 
striking threads for elucidating Buber’s interests in Daoism and 
phenomenological interpretation of the Daodejing that he based on Victor 
von Strauss’s 1870 translation and commentary and, rarely in this text, 
Richard Wilhelm’s 1921 edition.14
Buber commenced his philosophically oriented commentary on this 
Chinese classic with an introduction that considers two reoccurring themes: 
(1) the Chinese conception of heart (xin 心) identified as the feeling of taste 
and sensuous contact with the external world that is both directional and 
relational, in contrast to the Western notion of interiority; and (2) Laozi as 
a thinker of return.15
This introduction indicates that the Daodejing is not a form of mysticism 
in at least two senses: it does not maintain a radical submersion into 
interiority and subjectivity, the depths and dark night of the soul, or an 
otherworldly mysticism directed into a transcendent super-sensuous realm. 
Instead, the Daodejing teaches the relational interconnection of heart and 
world. Accordingly, in commenting on the first chapter of the Daodejing 
that Strauss entitled the realization or fulfillment of the dao (“Verwirklichung 
des Tao”) and Wilhelm the embodiment of sense (“Verkörperung des 
Sinns”), Buber defined the Chinese word dao 道 as path (Bahn) and way 
(Weg) and as change/exchange (Weschsel) and change/transformation 
(Wandel).16
Already in his reading of the first chapter, Buber traces three dimensions 
of Laozi’s way: (1) It is a natural philosophy of the regularity of nature, the 
movement of the stars, the change of seasons, the growth of plants, and 
rhythmic return; (2) It is a cosmology of the structuring whole of circles 
within circles, cycles within cycles, that is a chaos of transformations and an 
interconnected structured cosmic order; and (3) It is an ontological teaching 
distinguishing (a) the dao that can be spoken, the dao’s finitization as 
pathway and manifestation as transformation (cosmology), and (b) the 
unsayable and limitless dao that exceeds it.17
It is at this point in his commentary that Buber enters into a reflection on 
naming and encountering that reflects a significant topos in his own path of 
thinking.
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3. Naming, Encountering, and the Thing
A standard theory of language construes names as arbitrarily designated 
conventional terms that are reified when taken to indicate the actual essences 
of things. This account is often applied to early Daoist texts in contemporary 
philosophy, and Daoist words are classified as conventions and its philosophy 
of language as nominalist. Buber, in this commentary and in I and Thou, 
contests this abstract epistemological and impersonal model of language 
with the counter-argument that such conventional names are not genuine 
names. There is a distinction in the Daodejing between inconstant 
conventional names, associated with fluctuating finite paths, and so-called 
“eternal” or “constant” names (changming 常名) mentioned in chapter 1 of 
the text.
Buber sketched an intriguing phenomenological interpretation of 
Laozi’s “constant name.” Eternal names are those that are “not constructed 
but discovered” in encounter (Begegnung) and in “the reality of the 
relation.”18 The mutuality of “the thing and the I” is necessary for this 
relation in which the name operates as the being-between (dazwischen) this 
specific being and myself. This sense of “self” is what Buber described in I 
and Thou as the relational participating self. Things search for words 
through us as participatory intermediaries. The movement from things to 
names requires their being encountered by me from and in themselves. There 
is accordingly, Buber notes, an “interiority of the name that arises from 
things themselves.”19
Buber offers a phenomenological description of the encounter with the 
tree, an illustrative example that is also deployed in I and Thou.20 In the 
latter classic text from 1923, he distinguishes perceiving and representing 
the tree as an object, as an “it,” from encountering the tree as a relational 
other, as a “thou.” “Relation is reciprocity” (“Beziehung ist Gegenseitigkeit”) 
with respect to the encountered tree, and consequently other “non-human” 
beings. In the Daodejing commentary from 1924, he recognized how the 
tree, insofar as it is encountered as this being, is not subsumed under a 
conceptual category or regarded through a nominal conventional name. On 
the contrary, the tree is encountered as “this tree” and “something for itself” 
“insofar as it is something for me.”21
The description of the I–thou relation between human and thing in I and 
Thou corresponds in word and tone with his portrayal of the thing, 
encompassing both animate and inanimate beings, in the Zhuangzi in 1910 
and the Daodejing in 1924. Relation signifies an ethical relation and naming 
is an ethical response to the thing’s own path and way of being itself (that is, 
its self-so-ness or ziran 自然).
To draw a preliminary conclusion at this moment, one that will receive 
further contextualization in what follows, Buber’s “interpersonal ethics” 
draws in part on his analysis of the relationality of and responsiveness 
toward things, does not exclude the “interthingly” and non-human from 
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the ethical encounter and interbodily relationship, a problem that places 
into question the appropriateness of other overly anthropocentric varieties 
of “personalist ethics” that neglect the non-human in the ethical 
encounter.22
4. Broken Words and Namelessness
Buber has been criticized by Levinas, who endeavored to distance his own 
project emphasizing asymmetrical responsibility from Buber’s ostensible 
idea of “symmetrical reciprocity,” for inadequately attending to the alterity, 
asymmetries, and distances between self and Other in the I–thou 
relationship.23 However, this critique is off the mark to the extent that Buber 
appears deeply concerned with the singularity of the thing and the other in 
the encounter, the asymmetries between the myriad things (including the 
non-human) rather than only the human other, and indeed the non-
encounters and distances between I and thou, and between name and named. 
These dimensions of Buber’s thought are apparent in I and Thou and in this 
introduction to the Daodejing.
Continuing to comment on the initial verse of the Daodejing, Buber 
draws on Western religious thought, such as the notion of divine glory and 
human distance from it, in introducing questions of the name’s distance 
from what it would name. His clarification of the mutuality of name and 
thing in the Daodejing is accordingly reoriented with a reflection on human 
inadequacy in each encounter with the thing and the brokenness intrinsic to 
names and words. Buber specifies the limitations of naming and language 
that transpire even in the modality of the encounter: “our names do not 
deliver the consummate essence” of the thing and, restating the opening 
lines of chapter 1 of the Daodejing, “the name that can be named is the 
broken name.”24
Buber noted how: “Every image contains an element of brokenness.”25 
But not only the image is broken: broken words and mutilated bodies, such 
as the disfigured bodies of the Zhuangzi, reappear in Buber’s discussions of 
Jewish and Chinese sources, and Buber compares Judaism to a body 
disfigured by its wandering from the Orient to the Occident and persecution 
in his 1915 essay “The Spirit of the Orient and Judaism.”26
Buber’s deployment of the language of fragmentation, brokenness, and 
human alienation from naturalness is not the conclusion of his analysis, 
as it is linked—as it is in the Zhuangzi—with transformation. Human 
brokenness is a point of transition and allows a pivot from the cosmological 
world of names and things to what Buber designates the ontological: “the 
name is a step toward the consummate name, the many a hint of the one, 
and the broken an indication of the unbroken.”27
Line four of chapter 1 of the Daodejing discloses that this transition is 
interconnected with the questions of the status and appropriate role of the 
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human. Buber differentiated three fundamental themes of the Daodejing 
from which all the others are constructed.28 These three spheres exhibit 
a process of alienation from and return to nature and the nature of things: 
(1) The law (das Gesetz), the dao of heaven that consists of things happening 
from themselves; (2) The human (der Mensch), as estranged from nature; 
and (3) The kingdom (Reich), as the construction or formation (aufbauen) 
of a realm in which natural order is recreated,29 or—as he clarified later—a 
community.30 The third sphere is the sphere of the good (das Gute) to which 
we will turn in the next section. In the daily renewal of creation,31 
humans emerge, as evident in his other writings on Zhuangzi and Judaism, 
as ethical beings who are co-creators of creation through formative 
participation in it.32
The formative recovery of the natural in the third sphere is associated 
with the ontological truth of the nameless. Victor von Strauss translated the 
third line of chapter 1 of the Daodejing, “無名天地之始；有名萬物之母,” as 
“Das namenlose ist des Himmels und der Erde Urgrund, Das Namen-
Habende ist aller Wesen Mutter.” Buber focused in his remarks on this 
originary ground (Urgrund): the consummate, the one, and the unbroken 
intimate the nameless originary ground that is the mother of all things 
through the emergence of names—identifying rather than distinguishing the 
nameless (wuming 無名) and name-having or forming (youming 有名).
The nameless exceeds all designations, thingliness, and serial causality, 
including being posited as a beginning or first cause. Buber did not explicitly 
mention the Chinese character shi 始 that is often translated as beginning or 
origin. Following Strauss’s translation, shi 始 is interpreted as not signifying 
a causal or ontic beginning or origin in any sense. Antedating Martin 
Heidegger’s phenomenological elucidation of “ground,” Buber explicates 
the originless “originary ground” as a necessarily non-causal ontological 
truth through which name and thing, language and world, become possible.33 
In the Daodejing, this ground appears as an abyssal lack of ground 
(Abgrund), a swirling groundless depth (“schwingende, grundlose Tiefe”), 
as indicated by the key Daoist image of water.34
Even though Buber’s depiction primarily relies on Strauss’s rendition of 
the Daodejing, he did not exclusively rely on it. For instance, in his portrayal 
of line four of the first chapter of the Daodejing, he rejected Strauss’s 
translation of xuan 玄 as “deep,” noting that it means “dark” (dunkel) 
and secret or mystery (Geheimnis).35 Wilhelm, for example, speaks of 
Geheimnis and wonder in his rendition of this chapter. The German word 
Geheimnis used to translate xuan means secret as well as mystery. This 
deeper secret within the secret, the depth deeper than depth, Buber noted, 
is the genuine gateway (Pforte). The threshold or the portal is a pivot 
and point of transition. The Daodejing’s “return” (Rückkehr) is not as a 
recovery of a primitive past or repetition of a previous state, but—as will be 
addressed further below—the turning around (Umkehr) of transition and 
transformation.36
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5. The Law, the human, and the Kingdom
Buber presented the Daodejing in his 1924 lectures as a teaching of the law, 
humanity, and the kingdom that he defined as community (Gemeinschaft).
First, the sphere of the law, as mentioned previously, is the immanent self-
regulating self-occurring of things. The thing is transformed into a mere 
object of desire and use when they are broken from the encounter and taken 
out of the fullness of their relational context.37
Second, the human sphere has distanced itself from the life of things. It 
has alienated itself from the law (the cosmological functioning of the dao) 
through non-genuine life, which includes morals, rituals, political regulations, 
and other fixations. This Daodejing repeatedly problematizes ordinary 
Confucian virtues and the conventional morality of good and evil: the 
posited good is complicit with the evil that is necessarily co-posited along 
with it, the relative good is interdependent with the bad, and the stated 
propositional and moralistic good cannot adequately grasp the dao’s 
originary richness and fullness.38
Buber did not conclude that this problematization of morality entails 
amorality, immorality, or attitudes of ethical indifference, skepticism, and 
nihilism. Such interpretations of Daoism, which have become prevalent in 
contemporary Western philosophical approaches, are opposed to Chinese 
commentarial transmissions as well as Buber’s assessment that the Daoism 
of the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi is a radical teaching of the good. The 
fullness of the dao is not opposed to the good; it is originary goodness 
itself—linked with images of the mother and the feminine—in contrast to 
non-genuine, broken, and partial ways of enacting it associated with the 
partiality of the masculine.39
What about the third sphere? Buber designated it the kingdom, realm, or 
empire (Reich), evoking Jewish and Abrahamic conceptions of the “kingdom 
of God” (Hebrew: malchut מלכות). In his 1928 essay “China and Us,” Buber 
contends in the face of the increasing destructiveness of modern technological 
civilization and its self-assertive will to power that Western humanity needs to 
relearn in its own terms and situation the Daoist teaching of “non-action.” In 
this 1924 context, Buber elucidates how one cannot do the good but how the 
good transpires through “doing-non-doing” (tun nicht tun, weiwuwei 爲無爲). 
The holy or sagely person, through whom the good is enacted and the third 
sphere of the kingdom fulfilled, neither imposes nor withdraws, and is neither 
active nor passive in relation to the world. Rather, the sage is spontaneous 
and responsive, responding in being called (angerufen).40
In this discussion, in addition to the 1928 essay, Daoism appears to offer 
a unique and significant philosophical and religious response to the 
problematic of modernity and the human condition. Hence, first, whereas 
Buber portrays the Buddhist ideal as one of self-redemption, the Daoist ideal 
is one of world-redemption through the happening of the dao, of the good, 
which is neither in nor reducible to time and history.41 Daoism does not 
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demand the denial and the de-individuation of the self (Entselbstung); it 
points toward the constitutive relationality and sociality of the individual 
and the individual’s fulfillment (Vollendung) in the dao.42
6. The Anarchy of the Good and the 
Fulfillment of the Kingdom
Buber construed the Daoist good as fundamentally ethical and social; it is 
equally both interthingly and interpersonal, as no absolute distinction can 
be drawn between things, organisms, and persons.43 The good is fulfilled in 
the kingdom, interpreted as a free relational community. Moreover, the 
Daoist good becomes messianic (that is, it concerns the genuine king to 
come) and prophetic (that is, it concerns the earthly fulfillment of the good) 
in this elucidation. These are “weak,” intercultural and secularized (as 
primarily ethical), delineations of the messianic and prophetic moments: 
(1) The messianic is glimpsed in the figure of the sage-king (shengren 聖人) 
who lets the self-generating self-relating community become itself through 
weiwuwei; and (2) The prophetic is apprehended in the originary ethics of 
the enactment and practice of the good.
The Daodejing’s message is neither mystical nor monistic absorption into 
the totality of the one.44 It does not offer a phenomenology of experience, 
consciousness, or Dasein, but suggests a different phenomenological strategy 
of tracing encounters within relational reality. Buber’s reconstruction of 
Daoism resonates with his own ethical and this-worldly interpretation of 
Judaism, in particular in its Hassidic forms that share a more intimate affinity 
with Daoism in Buber’s early works. Buber’s Hasidic Judaism and Daoism 
enact the divine in everyday communicative and corporeal life. Second, 
however, crucial differences remain: Buber states that Daoism teaches 
through nature itself, through encountering immanent reality, what Judaism 
and early Christianity attempt to teach through ethical prescriptions.45
Daoism (or at least its pre-Qin variety) is neither primitive nor pagan, 
according to Buber’s response to these monotheistic criticisms in his 
correspondence with Rosenzweig.46 Buber, as an intercultural theopolitical 
philosopher, can recognize it as a teaching of fulfilled life, evoking the Jewish 
conception of a restored world (Hebrew: tikkun olam ןוקית  םלוע) that 
encompasses both the natural and the human.47
Buber’s Daodejing is a teaching of the good as messianic or prophetic 
anarchism.48 The social fulfillment of the good, the teaching of the kingdom 
is in a non-doing and letting in which the ruler lets the people come to 
themselves and to life.49 The non-coercive sage-king is a messianic figure in 
embodying the authority of a teacher and an exemplary model, as well as 
the “lonely one” called to responsiveness and responsibility to and for 
others.50
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The distinction between authority and freedom governs Buber’s 
juxtaposition of Confucius and Laozi in his depictions of the two in 1924,51 
1928, and in 1951. Buber’s Confucius teaches human politics consisting of 
intentional, calculative, judgmental, and moralistic ritual and justice based 
on distinction (rank) and distance. In contrast to Confucius, who appears 
limited in Buber’s Daoist-oriented perspective, Laozi communicates the 
originary ethics of the good: the radical intentionless spontaneity of 
proximity and love.52 This assessment is reconfirmed in his 1951 essay 
“Society and the State.” Buber continued to distinguish between Confucian 
authoritarian and statist rule by elites and the self-generating self-
organization of the people in love and proximity.53 Buber’s Daoism is 
communitarian and anarchistic.
While Confucius is an educator through externally imposed prescriptive 
laws and life-rules, in which the dead dominate the living, Laozi is a teacher 
of the internally motivated, self-generating, and living incalculable good. 
This good and its community do not occur through my own action, 
deliberation, and judgment. The partial and non-relational masculine human 
self damages and destroys itself and others through self-assertion.54 Absorbed 
in itself and its own anxieties, calculations, and concerns, the self of the 
second sphere (humanity) is estranged from the law and the kingdom. It is 
in this context that the estranged self should become again like the newborn 
child through non-intentional non-coerced non-doing. The good occurs 
through the freedom of naturally and relationally being what one is in 
doing-non-doing understood as non-assertion, non-imposition, and non-
striving.55
The Daodejing appears to intimate a utopian ideal of an ethical 
community motivated by love and oriented toward the self-generating good 
instead of the self-assertive willfulness and external regulations that lead to 
estrangement and destruction.56 However, this is not an empty speculation 
for “beautiful souls” for Buber.57 In his discussion of Daodejing chapter 20, 
Laozi emerges as a prophetic witness speaking from out of the truth of the 
dao in the abandonment, brokenness, and suffering of the human sphere.58 
Daoism, as a consequence of this prophetic witnessing, has a social-critical 
dimension to it in relation to the suffering and injustices of the present.59
7. Origin, Movement, and Fulfillment
The fulfillment of the dao transpires immanently in the midst of earthly 
human life through the transition from human partialness, lack, and 
deficiency to balancing in the grace and other-power of the dao.60 The dao’s 
grace (Gnade) and nourishing power is taken to be “religious” in the sense 
of its being independent of individual willing and willfulness.61 The dao that 
nurtures and nourishes all things (sphere one) also heals (sphere three). 
Playing on the etymological kinship between the German words heil 
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(healing) and heilig (holy), Buber identified the “holy” with that which 
heals the wound, and with a restorative becoming whole in the face of 
brokenness.62
This “turning” is a process of transformation: in the movement through 
negativity and opposition, there is no “return” to or pure reproduction of 
the condition of the spontaneous automatic law that is enacted in things. 
Buber maintained that the law’s fulfillment occurs in the genuine love and 
responsiveness of the living communicative kingdom.63 Buber’s dao proceeds 
from the law to love via the moment of human brokenness. The dao is an 
anarchistic originary ethics of the good in and for itself.64
What is the logic of the dao’s motility? Laozi’s Daoism does not promote 
a return as a reduction to the primitive in Buber’s account. The Daodejing’s 
language of return is a discourse of transitions and transformations that 
does not abandon humanity in the movement toward fulfillment in the dao 
nor multiplicity in the return to the one.65 Given this attention to transitions 
and transformation, and resting in mobility, the Daodejing offers models of 
dynamic relational wholes instead of a monistic static unitary oneness.
How then should the notion of “return” be interpreted? Fan 反 (return, 
reversal) only appears four times in the standard version of the Daodejing 
(chapters 25, 40, 65, and 78). Due to its being identified with the movement 
of the dao itself in chapter 40 (反者道之動；弱者道之用), it serves as a 
central concept in interpreting the Daodejing’s logic or dialectic. As noted 
previously, in Buber’s exposition return (Rückkehr) signifies turning. It is 
misinterpreted when taken as a mere arrival back at a prior or previous 
point in a series; it is a point of transition, a turning around (Umkehr) as 
culmination.66
Thus to briefly introduce the examples of the newborn and the seed 
considered in Buber’s commentary: (1) The Daodejing’s images of the 
flexibility, spontaneity, and vitality of the newborn baby do not entail a 
return to that initial state; and (2) Nor is it a return to the state of being 
a seed in the origin. Comparing it to the primordial light (Urlicht) described 
in the Talmud, “return” is a resting in the origin and the movement of the 
whole relational nexus of things.67 “Return” is for that reason not a 
reduction to an embryonic or primeval original condition. The movement of 
the dao through reversals and returns is the formation by humans (sphere 
two) of a fulfilled life in the good (sphere three) that is no longer merely law 
(sphere one).
8. Conclusion: Intercultural Philosophy and 
the Phenomenology of the Encounter
It is noteworthy that Buber adopted this notion of return in his intercultural 
assessment of the significance of Daoism. This interpretation of turning in 
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the Daodejing is employed as a model for how the West can encounter and 
learn from the teaching of the dao.68 As in his other works examining early 
pre-Qin Daoism, Buber repeatedly—in 1909, 1924, and 1928—connects the 
Daoism of Laozi and Zhuangzi to the dilemmas of modern technological 
civilization, contending that the teaching of the way addresses the 
contemporary European precisely in this sense of “turning around” rather 
than demanding a return to a supposedly more primitive and primordial 
way of living.69
Further, as Buber noted in reflecting on chapter 29 of the Daodejing, this 
“turning around” toward the thing and the other is a practical question. The 
possibility of genuine community is not only confronted with individual 
self-absorption and estranged separation. Buber presciently noted that it is 
all the more needful given the willfulness and sickness of peoples in 
nationalism and racism.70
Can classical Chinese philosophies such as Confucianism and Daoism 
resolve the destructiveness of the modern West, as experienced by Buber in 
the crisis-ridden Weimar Republic? Buber explicitly began “China and Us” 
with the argument that they cannot.71 Nevertheless, he added, Daoist wuwei 
is the teaching that Western modernity, in its willfulness and will to dominate 
persons and things, lacks and is in need of learning in its own sense and 
context in dialogue with this Chinese discourse.72 To this extent, intercultural 
dialogue is a moment in this “turning around,” revealing previously 
unrecognized paths. This is not a return, in the narrow sense of the concept, 
as the path is to be encountered and enacted anew.
In addition to intercultural communication and philosophizing, a turn to 
a phenomenology of the encounter and the communicative relational event 
is required. Buber described in his 1924 discussion, explored in this 
chapter, how the Daodejing provides a model of the encounter. This poses 
us with a significant question in Buber’s analysis: how can we encounter 
what the Daodejing is modeling? Buber concluded his 1928 essay with 
the demand to encounter for ourselves the reality exhibited in the 
Daodejing and that is indicated by expressions such as “non-doing.”73 What 
is called for to “turn around” is the encounter with things and persons 
themselves, and therefore a philosophy that is a phenomenology of the 
encounter itself. Buber’s classic work I and Thou is such a phenomenology 
of the encounter in which self and other are recognized as fundamentally 
relational realities.
In conclusion, Buber’s interpretations of the Daodejing (examined in this 
chapter) as well as the Zhuangzi (which was not discussed here) remain an 
evocative historical example of intercultural hermeneutics. His readers 
can trace how Buber honed his own unique philosophical project in 
intercultural dialogue with Daoist and a diverse variety of philosophical and 
religious discourses. His art of philosophy, as an interculturally informed 
phenomenology of the encounter and the communicative event, can itself be 
interpreted as an exemplary model to be enacted and transformed anew.
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